

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT

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COUNTRY	USSR	REPORT	
SUBJECT	A Soviet Intellectual's Views on Conditions in the Soviet Union	DATE DISTR.	8 February 1955
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This is UNEVALUATED
 Information

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THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
 THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
 (FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

1. [] considerable progress is being made in the economic development of the Soviet Union. This is particularly true of Soviet industry, but some progress is also under way in the field of agriculture. The results are not as readily discernible in agriculture as they are in industry. 25X1
2. [] progress can be achieved through evolution alone. He explain how progress could be achieved without fundamental changes /in the system/. At [] there was no chance for an evolutionary change in the Soviet Union. [] even if certain significant improvements were made, evolution was not possible so long as there was only one party in the country. 25X1 25X1
3. [] a revolution in the USSR was not possible or, at any rate, not on the scale of the revolution in 1917. [] the validity of the Marxist hypothesis that leadership exercises a strong influence on the base and is even capable of changing it. [] the base determines everything. [] the apathy manifested by the Russian people during the early stages of world war II and the long suffering they endured before reacting. [] once the Russian people begin to stir, it will be impossible to restrain them. 25X1 25X1 25X1
4. [] there is more likelihood of a military coup d'etat /than there is of a revolution/, [] a loss as to who would attempt it. [] the situation in the USSR and the mood of the Soviet Army in 1941 /were conducive to a military coup d'etat/, [] the people were too unenlightened to cope with the situation. /Without leadership and without the conscious support of the people/, the army would cast its support behind the regime. 25X1 25X1

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STATE	X	ARMY	X	NAVY	X	AIR	X	FBI		AEC		OCI	Ev	X	
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





(NOTE: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#".)


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5.  the people of Leningrad are quite unique. 25X1
Many of them belong to the intelligentsia, and, unlike the inhabitants of
Moscow, they like to criticize. 25X1
6.  knew of the Petrov defections in Australia,  had never 25X1
heard of the Khokhlov affair. It was his firm conviction that the Soviet press
would never publish anything like the Khokhlov affair.
7. In talking about the forced repatriation of Soviet citizens in 1945,  25X1
 opposed such a policy. 25X1
8.  since the death of Stalin and the liquidation of 25X1
Beriya, there was more justice in the Soviet Union.
9.  exhibited no indignation when criticism was made of Soviet society, 25X1
the governing Communist circles, and the dictatorship of the Politburo (sic).



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